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ABSTRACT 
Foreign inflows are important sources of income that many African governments use to finance public 
investments and to support the development of manufacturing or export-oriented service sectors. Yet the 
recent growth experience of many African economies shows that domestic-oriented industry 
(construction, utilities) and services have become the largest sectors. Using Ghana and its newly found oil 
as an example, we analyze the dynamic relationship between increasing foreign inflows and economic 
growth and structural change by developing a multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model. We 
find that the sudden increase in petrodollars used to finance either the government’s recurrent spending or 
public investment generates a substantial short-run growth shock consistent with the Dutch disease 
theory. Opposed short-run effects on the growth of the tradable and nontraded sectors lead the structure of 
the economy to become more domestic oriented. The creation of an oil fund helps reduce the negative 
growth and structural effect, while in the longer term, if oil spending does not enhance productivity, 
growth declines and the GDP share of the nontraded sector further increases. Smart use of oil revenue 
thus not only involves the creation of an oil fund but also spending inflows on productivity-enhancing 
investment. Whether public investments can help overcome Dutch disease effects also depends on the 
growth magnitude of the inflows. At the same level of investment-to-productivity-growth efficiency, 
public investments take longer to overcome the negative growth effects the higher the growth rate of 
inflows. This paper further shows that the structural effect of foreign inflows on economic development is 
a long-term challenge for Africa. The domestic-oriented economic structure can become a persistent 
phenomenon for countries that continue to receive foreign inflows in the form of petrodollars or in any 
other form.  
Keywords:  growth, structural change, foreign inflows, Dutch disease, Africa, Ghana, intertemporal 
general equilibrium 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Low savings rates have been seen as a binding constraint to growth in low-income countries, and foreign 
inflows seem to be the logical and reasonable alternative source of savings to stimulate growth. Indeed, 
international financial flows to developing countries resumed in the 1990s and 2000s after the structural 
adjustment period, and globalization seems to have further stimulated the process. In the context of 
African countries, however, foreign inflows are mainly in the form of foreign aid, either through direct 
government budget support or through other types of grants provided by developed countries’ 
governments and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, private foreign inflows to Africa have also 
increased. While foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have started to play a more important role 
recently, remittances continue to be the main source of private foreign inflows to African countries. In 
Ghana, for example, remittances accounted for one-quarter of total inflows in 2007, and similar levels can 
be observed in many countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Traditional sources of foreign exchange 
earnings from primary-product exports have further enhanced the upward trend in foreign inflows driven 
by the recent boom in prices for resource and primary agricultural products. While direct foreign 
borrowing is still rare, several African countries with improved macroeconomic conditions and 
governance increasingly have been able to gain access to international capital markets. Ghana, for 
example, has recently launched bonds on the London market worth US$750 million, which have been 
oversubscribed, with US$3 billion in offers received.  
Intuitively, increased inflows should help developing countries overcome the classical growth 
challenge by providing additional funds for investment, particularly for public investment. When foreign 
inflows are efficiently invested in public goods and education, these inflows are expected to have a 
positive impact on growth by increasing human capital and improving the productivity of physical capital. 
Does growth via foreign inflows happen automatically? Recent growth experiences of developing 
countries and the voluminous literature on aid effectiveness and resource booms
1
Against this background, this study is motivated by the potential growth and structural challenges 
induced by recent increases in foreign inflows to African countries. Although the macroeconomic 
challenges created by foreign inflows are well known, their effect on the choice of long-term development 
paths is less well understood. This choice of development path becomes an increasingly relevant issue for 
many African countries as they are striving to become middle-income countries and achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. For example, it can be easily observed that prices for domestic goods 
and services (including urban wage rates) in African capital cities (e.g., Accra) have been much higher in 
recent years than in similar-size cities in Asian developing countries (e.g., Phnom Penh). This observation 
leads to a more fundamental development question: Can African countries develop a labor-intensive 
 have painted a mixed 
picture. In examining the effects of aid on growth in cross-sectional and panel data after correcting for 
bias, Rajan and Subramanian (2005) find little robust evidence of a positive or negative relationship 
between aid inflows to a country and its economic growth. Through the effect of inflows on the real 
exchange rate, countries with larger net inflows and more open capital accounts tend to have more 
overvalued currencies (Rodrik 2009a). Foreign finance has indeed relaxed the constraint of low domestic 
savings and led to growth in investment in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey; however, because capital inflows 
are highly volatile and subject to “sudden stops,” none of these countries has been able to generate 
consistently high growth since the end of the 1980s (Rodrik 2009b). In summary, even without taking 
typical institutional and governance issues related to the sudden increases in foreign inflows into 
consideration, foreign inflows are often associated with real exchange rate appreciation, construction 
booms, competition of the nontraded sector with manufacturing for scarce resources (e.g., energy), and 
inflation pressures from the growing demand for nontraded goods. These factors have long-run growth 
effects and can make it more difficult for developing countries to transform their economies by delaying 
the emergence of an export-oriented and labor-intensive manufacturing sector.  
                                                       
1 Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004), among many other key papers, provide a comprehensive survey on this issue.  2 
Asian-type manufacturing sector that can compete with Asian products either in the country’s own 
domestic market or in developed countries’ markets? If the next step in development for many African 
countries is not to develop such a manufacturing sector, what will be a suitable industrialization and 
development path that African countries can pursue instead? 
Differences in development paths between natural-resource-rich and natural-resource-poor 
countries have been discussed in the development literature. By comparing different product mixes 
among Latin American, Asian, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries, Leamer et al. (1999) find that Latin America exchanges natural resources and food for 
manufactures; Asia trades labor-intensive products for capital-intensive machinery and chemicals; and the 
OECD provides sophisticated manufactures and chemicals in exchange for materials, clothing, and toys. 
Although African countries are not included in this study, in terms of the product mix and initial 
conditions of resource endowments (such as land and other natural resources), one can safely position 
most African countries closer to Latin America than to Asia. If the initial conditions of most African 
countries have already prevented them from developing Asian-style labor-intensive manufacturing, 
increased foreign inflows (besides those from natural resource exports) can be expected to further pull 
these countries away from this Asian-type development path. Then the question is: What is next for 
African countries after the boom in foreign inflows?  
The possible negative effect of foreign inflows on growth (if the institutional side effect is 
ignored), regardless of whether the inflows come from increased commodity prices, foreign aid, or 
resource booms, is Dutch disease. From this point of view, the resource-curse literature can provide 
additional insights. While different methodologies have been used to study the resource curse, the 
literature is dominated by cross-sectional growth regressions.
2
In addition to reduced-form growth regressions, a few structural (theoretical) models are used in 
explaining how resource abundance in general or resource booms in particular shift resources away from 
economic sectors that have positive externalities for growth. Sachs and Warner (1999), for example, 
develop a dynamic Dutch disease model. By constructing a sector with increasing returns to scale in an 
economy, together with a constant-returns-to-scale sector, the authors’ Dutch disease model shows that 
the impact of a natural resource boom on growth depends on whether the increasing-returns sector is 
traded or nontraded. The possibly positive effect of a natural resource boom on growth critically depends 
on whether the nontraded sector has positive externalities (through increasing returns to scale) for growth. 
However, in reality, the manufacturing sector that is traded is often characterized by increasing returns, 
and thus a resource boom has a negative effect on growth by drawing resources away from the 
manufacturing sector. Obviously, in the theoretical model the long-run effect of foreign inflows, which 
can be in the form of resource boom revenues or foreign aid, depends on how the relationship between 
inflows and productivity growth—either through positive externalities as in Sachs and Warner (1999) or 
through a link to public investment, financed by the inflows—is modeled. Using a simple growth model, 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005) show that even under the most optimistic assumptions about the use of aid 
(optimistic in the sense that all aid is invested, none of it is wasted or consumed, and the Dutch disease 
effect on domestic price is totally ignored), the impact of aid should be positive but relatively small in 
magnitude. Moreover, once inflows are partially spent on nontraded goods, through the Dutch disease 
effect the positive public investment–productivity linkage effect on growth can be canceled out. Agénor, 
Bayraktar, and Aynaoui (2008) develop a dynamic macroeconomic model in which foreign aid can raise 
 To overcome the shortcomings of this 
methodology, Collier and Goderis (2007) adopt a panel cointegration method to disentangle the short- and 
long-run effects of commodity prices on growth, and still the authors find strong evidence in support of 
the resource-curse hypothesis.  
                                                       
2 Empirical findings that resource-abundant countries tend to grow more slowly than resource-scarce countries are 
documented in Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001); Gylfason, Herbertsson, and Zoega (1999); Leite and Weidmann (1999); Auty 
(2001); Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio (2005); and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). Deaton and Miller (1995) and 
Raddatz (2007), however, find quite contrary results: Commodity booms significantly raise growth. A few studies that use panel 
data find that the resource-curse effect disappears once one allows for fixed effects; see, for example, Mazano and Rigobon 
(2006) and Murshed (2004). Van der Ploeg (2007) provides a comprehensive survey of the resource-curse literature.  3 
public investment, which, in turn, either directly results in output growth (through accumulation of public 
capital) or indirectly improves productivity through human capital accumulation. The model is calibrated 
to the Ethiopian economy and is used to assess the growth and poverty-reduction effects of changes in the 
level of nonfood aid. By simulating a permanent increase in nonfood aid that is equivalent to 5 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP), the model results in about 1 percentage point of additional growth in the 
long run. However, this model simulation outcome crucially depends on the fiscal parameters that 
describe the impact of aid on the tax rate, current government spending, and public investment, as well as 
on the efficiency assumption of public investment. Within the range of two standard-error confidence 
intervals, the growth effect of public investment does not necessarily mitigate the Dutch disease effect. 
With a higher adverse impact of aid on the tax rate and recurrent spending, and a lower positive effect on 
public investment, the Dutch disease effect would become more persistent, which would lead to an 
unsustainable external position. 
While a structural approach relates empirical results to specific behavioral assumptions and 
parameters, the above models seem either too simple or too aggregate to explain how important a 
country’s initial condition is in determining the effect of Dutch disease on alternative growth paths. In the 
simple growth model of Rajan and Subramanian (2005) and in the dynamic macroeconomic model of 
Agenor, Bayraktar, and Aynaoui (2008), the economy is highly aggregated (as a single output sector). 
Although there are two sectors, traded and nontraded, in Sachs and Warner (1999), the structure (or size) 
of these two sectors seems not to matter. The demand side is modeled in a very simplistic way in all these 
models, as is the trade relationship with the rest of world. Both factors are important in understanding 
how Dutch disease works through the economy in affecting resource allocation and growth. Moreover, 
none of the above models considers the intertemporal decision process of the private sector (consumers or 
producers). There is no capital, and hence the intertemporal saving and investment decisions of the 
private sector are not included in the simple growth model of Rajan and Subramanian (2005) or the 
dynamic Dutch disease model of Sachs and Warner (1999). While in Agénor, Bayraktar, and Aynaoui 
(2008) private capital accumulation is included, there is no behavioral function to determine such 
accumulation. By ignoring intertemporal behavior in the general equilibrium model, these approaches do 
not allow the transitional process along the growth path to be captured.  
This paper fills the gap in the literature by developing a multisector intertemporal general 
equilibrium model in which capital accumulation is an endogenous result of the private sector’s 
intertemporal saving/investment decisions. Dutch disease affects growth through its effect on savings and 
investment, in addition to its effect on relative prices. The model is calibrated to Ghana’s economy in 
2007, and the increase in foreign inflows is based on the newly found oil and the expected amount of oil 
extraction in the future. Compared with other African countries in which oil or other natural resources 
have been discovered in the past, current conditions in Ghana seem favorable to avoiding the resource 
curse caused by institutional and/or political factors. State and institution building in Ghana has made 
rapid progress in recent years, and some important governance indicators, including government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption, have exceeded the regional averages of Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008). In terms of economic development, 
Ghana has experienced more than two decades of sound and persistent annual growth of around 5 percent 
and is among a group of very few African countries with positive per capita GDP growth over a relative 
long period of time. Despite this success, however, the Ghanaian economy displayed several structural 
characteristics typical of African countries with symptoms of Dutch disease even in the pre-oil era. 
Although the share of the agricultural sector in the total economy has declined over time, the sector still 
contributes about one-third of total GDP, which is above the African average. Also, the country’s export 
structure has not changed much over the last 50 years. Agricultural exports are concentrated in one crop 
(cocoa), which, together with gold, constitutes more than 60 percent of total exports. Declines in the 
relative importance of agriculture as a share of GDP have been compensated by the increases in services, 
urban construction, and utilities. These domestic-oriented activities currently make up more than 40 
percent of the economy. The manufacturing sector, which has been the main driver of growth in many 
Asian countries, has been declining relative to other sectors, from 9.0 percent of GDP in 2000 to 6.9 4 
percent in 2008 (Figure A1 in Appendix). In comparison, the share of manufacturing in GDP in Vietnam, 
Thailand, and China rose during their rapid economic transition process and was between 15 and 37 
percent when these countries had similar per capita income levels to Ghana in 2007 (Breisinger and Diao 
2009).  
In 2007 oil was discovered off the coast of Ghana, with total reserves estimated at between 500 
million and 1.5 billion barrels and the potential for future government revenues estimated at US$1–1.5 
billion annually (Osei and Domfe 2008; World Bank and IMF 2009). Measured by a modest long-term oil 
price of US$60 per barrel over the next 20 years, oil revenues will add around 30 percent to government 
income annually and constitute 10 percent of GDP over the exploitation period. Although the relative 
amount of expected oil revenue is smaller than in some other resource-rich countries (e.g., Angola, 
Botswana, and Nigeria), the expectations that additional oil revenue will help the country further 
accelerate growth and speed up economic transformation are high in the country. 
Given the experiences of its West African neighbors and other African countries, the Government 
of Ghana is well aware of the potential challenge that oil could present to economic development and the 
still very young democratic political system. However, there is an urgent need to spend the oil revenue to 
address key bottlenecks in developing industrial capacities, as stated in Ghana’s ambitious development 
plan, which aims at reaching a middle-income country status by 2015. Rather than focusing on the 
political economy of oil management and alternative options for oil revenue management, we use Ghana 
as an example to analyze the development challenge posed by increases in foreign inflows in a more 
general sense. The findings should be of interest not only for Ghana but also for other African developing 
countries that experience symptoms of Dutch disease.  
In the rest of paper we first introduce the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model in 
Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the short- and medium-run impacts of oil inflows on both growth and 
economic structure using the model. In Section 4 we assess whether smart oil management options can 
mitigate the Dutch disease effect by designing different oil management scenarios. Section 5 concludes 
the paper.  5 
2. A MULTISECTOR INTERTEMPORAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL  
FOR GHANA 
To address the research questions raised in the introduction of the paper, an analytic tool that is dynamic 
and incorporates multiple sectors in a general equilibrium framework is required in order to capture 
changes in the economic structure and the linkages between growth and the structure of the economy in 
the dynamic process. For this purpose, we develop a multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model 
for Ghana. With some modifications, this model is an extended neoclassical intertemporal general 
equilibrium model. Similar models have been developed by Wilcoxen (1988); Ho (1989); Goulder and 
Summers (1989); Go (1994); Mercenier and de Souza (1994); Diao and Yeldan (1998); Diao and 
Somwaru (2000); Diao and Roe (2003); and Diao, Rattsø, and Stokke (2005) for various developed and 
developing countries. In the context of the current study, we have made the following structural changes 
to the model.  
We first assume a relatively closed capital market in Ghana, even though the country is an open 
economy in terms of trade, and commodity imports and exports are endogenously determined in the 
model. While FDI has come to Ghana recently (stimulated particularly by the discovery of oil), foreign 
inflows through private-sector borrowing from international financial markets are still limited. Thus, in 
the model the domestic private sector is not allowed to borrow from abroad and the only foreign inflows 
are remittances, foreign aid and grants, and the government’s foreign borrowing. Such inflows are treated 
exogenously without an intertemporal decisionmaking problem.
3
The second structural change in the model relates to linking public investment with productivity 
at the sector level. While the fundamentals of the model are consistent with the neoclassical growth 
theory in which productivity growth is an exogenous variable, additional public investment through 
increased oil revenue is assumed to have growth effects on some sectors’ productivity, and hence the 
model can be used to quantitatively measure the impact of oil revenue management as either a short-run 
level effect or a long-run growth rate effect. Specifically, let 
 The advantage of this assumption is that 
it allows for an endogenous interest rate measured in the domestic currency and determined by the 
equilibrium in the domestic capital market. The domestic capital market is modeled through the 
intertemporal decisions of private savings and investment. While private savings are an endogenous 
variable (as in any Ramsey-type intertemporal model), government savings (plus foreign inflows to 
finance public investment) are exogenous. In this way, the government’s foreign debt is only an 
accounting term and will not affect the long-run equilibrium.  
  ( ) i i
f f i f i f i i i v B A X
ρ ρ α
1
, , , ) (
− − ∑ ⋅ =
  (1) 
represent the production function for sector i, which has constant returns to scale with constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) among inputs. In Equation (1), Xi is output of sector i, vi,f is a vector of inputs,  i A
is the shift parameter in the production function, and f i B ,  is the level of factor productivity and is linked 
with public investment: 
  1   , ) 1 ( 1 , , 1 , , , , , = ⋅ + + = − f i t f i
p
t i f t f i B B g g B
  (2) 
                                                       
3 This does not mean that foreign inflows are fixed. Growth in such inflows is constant when inflows are treated 
exogenously. Moreover, to support the existence of a steady state equilibrium, growth rate of foreign has to be the same as the 
long-run economic growth rate. 6 
In Equation (2),  f g
is an exogenous part of the factor productivity growth rate that is not linked with 
increased public investment, and 
p
t i g ,  is an endogenous part of the productivity growth rate that is the 
outcome of increased public investment. Both  f g
and 
p
t i g , are positive for inputs of labor and land and 
zero for capital in each sector. 
p
t i g , is determined by the growth in public investment financed through 
increased oil revenue only, that is: 
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where
p
t K and 
0 , p
t K are, respectively, the public capital stock formed by the public investment in the 
situation with oil revenue and without, 
p
t K ∆ and 
0 , p
t K ∆ are the public investment at time t with and 
without oil revenue, andε is the elasticity of productivity growth with respect to additional growth in the 
stock of public capital, and  1 0 < < i ε . 
Recognizing the separability of the consumer’s intratemporal decision problem from his or her 
intertemporal choices, the consumer’s optimization can be divided into two components. In the first 
component the representative consumer in the economy maximizes the overall utility defined in Equation 
(4) by choosing a composite consumption good intertemporally, and in the second component he or she 
chooses each sector’s good intratemporally for a given amount of the composite good defined in Equation 
(5) and the current budget constraint defined in Equation (6):  
  Max    (4) 
    (5) 
  s.t.   and    (6) 
In Equation (4), U1 is the value of the intertemporal utility evaluated at time period 1’s price of 
aggregate consumption (the composite good Qt),  is the time discount rate for the representative 
consumer, and   is the substitution elasticity over time. In equation (5), ci,t is the intratemporal 
consumption for sector good i,  is the minimum consumption of this good and is constant over time, and 
 is the intratemporal marginal budget share for consuming good i. In equation (6), PQt and Pi,t are, 
respectively, prices for Qt and ci,t at time t. Yt is the consumer’s income in each time period, and  is his 
or her savings at time t, which, as in a typical Ramsey one-sector framework, is an endogenous variable. 
In the general equilibrium framework, we assume that factor incomes, which are endogenous variables, 
all go to households, together with the exogenous incomes transferred from the government and abroad 
through remittances. Specifically: 
  , and     (7) 
where wf is returns to factor f, Vf is the total supply of factor f, trnsgov and trnsrow are transfers received 
by all the households from the government and abroad, and PoP is the country’s population. Besides 
capital that is endogenously accumulated over time, growth in labor and land supply is assumed to be 
exogenous. Similar as any intertemporal general equilibrium model, a complete labor market is assumed 7 
such that wage rate is an endogenous variable. Along the transitional equilibrium path, wage rate is not 
only affected by the change in labor allocation across sectors over time, but also affected by the 
productivity growth.  To simplify the model, we assume that the labor growth rate is the same as the 
population growth rate,
4
We skip the detailed discussion about the Euler equation for the consumer problem and the no-
arbitrage condition for the investment problem, the two most important intertemporal equations in the 
model. We also skip the discussion on the factor demand functions and commodity and factor market 
equilibrium conditions, which are similar to those in a static general equilibrium model (see Appendix for 
the mathematical presentation of the model). We focus on the government account in the rest of this 
section. 
  while land expansion is assumed to be slower than population growth. This 
implies that productivity growth for land (used by agricultural production only) must be faster than 
productivity growth for labor such that the differential transitional growth across sectors can eventually 
reach the same steady-state growth in the long run.  
The government has five interrelated functions in the model before oil is found in Ghana: to 
collect taxes, to distribute transfer payments to consumers, to purchase goods and services through its 
recurrent expenditures, to allocate parts of its revenue to public investment (through savings), and to 
administer foreign debt. The model is set up so that both the government’s savings and overseas 
borrowing grow exogenously at a fixed rate consistent with the combination of the exogenous part of the 
factor productivity growth rate and population growth. The annual recurrent expenditure is thus a residual 
term determined by the difference between government revenue and savings (including the payment to 
serve foreign debt). After oil is found, managing oil revenues becomes an additional government 
function. We assume that part of the oil revenue is owned by the government while the rest is owned by 
foreign companies and will not be spent in Ghana’s domestic market. This assumption is based on the fact 
that oil extraction will be conducted offshore and that foreign companies usually repatriate profits, and on 
the enclave nature of the oil sector. Oil revenues that accrue to the government take the form of royalties 
and taxes paid by the consortium of oil companies
5
Corresponding to the first five functions of the government, there are many different options for 
oil revenue management. We focus on three options that are most relevant to the current study. They are 
(1) to spend all petrodollars in each year as recurrent expenditure; (2) to invest 50 percent of oil revenue 
in productivity-enhancing public goods and services and allocate the remaining 50 percent to recurrent 
spending; and (3) to save 50 percent of oil revenue into an oil fund that invests in riskless foreign assets 
and earns a fixed income from these foreign assets in the future, and then to spend a certain percentage of 
the accumulated oil fund in the future. Together with 50 percent of current oil revenue, the spending will 
be equally split between public investment and recurrent expenditures. The first option can be seen as an 
example of a painful lesson that many oil-rich developing countries in the past experienced when oil was 
first found in their territory (see, for example, Harberger [2009] in the cases of Venezuela and Mexico). 
The second option is designed to evaluate whether a “smart” way of using oil revenues can overcome the 
negative Dutch disease effect. The third option reflects the practice of some oil-rich countries that have 
long experience in managing their natural resource revenues sustainably by using an allocation formula. 
The best self-restrained oil management model is Norway’s, which is based on a principle that oil is 
“national capital under the ground,” and it should remain national capital after it is extracted. With this 
option, the oil fund, which is invested in riskless or low-risk foreign assets, becomes permanent income-
producing capital. The above three options can be formally presented as follows: 
 to the government. Accordingly, we model the oil 
boom as an increase in GDP (a statistical effect) and in foreign exchange revenues to the government. 
                                                       
4 Unemployment has to be ignored in the neoclassic setting of an intertemporal general equilibrium model in which the 
wage rate is an endogenous variable and is determined by intra-temporal the labor market equilibrium conditions. While for a 
country like Ghana the perfect labor market assumption is rather strong, relaxing this assumption will not modify the major 
model results. Actually, existence of unemployment in the early stage of development seems to further support the paper’s major 
finding, i.e., the structure of the economy is not favorable for the development of labor intensive nonagricultural sectors.  
5 The consortium of oil companies comprises Tullow Oil, Kosmos Energy, and several other small-scale foreign operators. 
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In Equation (7), 
oil
t TY is total government income created from the oil sector; 
oil
t CY  and 
oil
t LY  represent, 
respectively, the current oil extraction revenue and the oil fund; and
oil
t LY r b ) ( + is the income earned or 
drawn from the oil fund. a represents the oil revenue allocation rule, b is the oil fund drawing rule, and r is 
the rate of return from investing in riskless foreign assets. In the first two options, a is 1.0 and LY is zero. 
Thus, b becomes irrelevant. In the third case, a is chosen to be 0.5, and r is around 0.12. We choose b to 
be at the same value as the long-run growth rate, that is, 0.051. 
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We calibrate the model to a new 2007 social accounting matrix (SAM) for Ghana, which is based 
on a 2005 SAM documented in Breisinger, Duncan, and Thurlow (2007). To update this SAM to 2007, 
we use national accounts provided by Ghana Statistical Services (GSS) for 2007, balance-of-payments 
data provided by the Bank of Ghana, and government budget data provided by the Ministry of Finance. 
While the newly developed SAM provides information on the demand and production structures of much 
more detailed sectors, for the purposes of this study we aggregate the economy into five sectors: (1) 
export agriculture, (2) other agriculture, (3) mining, (4) tradable nonagriculture, and (5) nontradable 
nonagriculture. Although we include nontraditional agriculture exports in the export agricultural sector, 
the sector is primarily dominated by cocoa and forestry, the most important traditional agricultural export 
products in Ghana. “Other agriculture” can be understood as a staple sector that includes both staple crops 
and livestock to mainly meet domestic food demand. Mining is an export sector and is dominated by gold 
in Ghana. We distinguish tradables from nontradables in the economic activities other than agriculture 
and mining because of the expected differential impact of the oil boom on these sectors. The tradable 
sector is dominated by manufacturing (which is highly import-dependent) and exportable services, while 
the nontradable sector includes construction, utilities, and private and public services. 
We calibrate the model without considering the oil boom and then shock the model by 
introducing oil revenues in three different simulations. To assess whether the model projections fit with 
the actual performance of the economy in the past, we first conduct a backcasting exercise with the 
model. We find that the growth path for GDP and agricultural GDP matches the actual performance of the 
economy well between 1995 and 2007 (see Figure A2 in Appendix). After that, we run the model starting 
in 2007 and extending to 2050 for the three scenarios corresponding to the three oil allocation options 
discussed above.  9 
3.  THE DUTCH DISEASE OF THE OIL BOOM: SHORT- AND MEDIUM-RUN 
IMPACTS ON GROWTH AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
In all three oil management scenarios, oil revenue grows at the same rate. Oil revenue growth is assumed 
to be rapid in the first five years after oil is found—a common observation in most countries where oil is 
discovered and extracted. After the first five years, oil revenues are assumed to grow steadily at a constant 
rate. Under the three scenarios, we further consider two situations in terms of medium- to long-run oil 
revenue growth. In the first situation, the medium- and long-run oil revenue growth rates are the same and 
are consistent with long-run GDP growth; thus, the ratio of oil revenue to GDP is relatively stable at 10 
percent in the long run. In the second situation, the medium-run oil revenue growth rate is higher than the 
long-run trend, and oil revenue rises to about 13 percent of GDP by 2030. After 2030 oil growth slows to 
the long-run GDP growth rate, and thus the ratio of oil revenue to GDP becomes constant (around 13 
percent) in the long run. These two different oil growth rates can also serve as a sensitive test for how the 
difference in oil revenue growth affects the model results. In this section, we focus on the first oil 
scenario, in which all oil revenue is spent by the government on recurrent items. We first discuss the 
short-run impact of this oil management option.  
In the short run, the expected outcome of a sudden increase in foreign inflows is an increase in 
the government’s demand for both domestic and imported goods. This causes prices for nontradable 
goods to rise and imports to increase. Increases in the prices of nontradable goods result in real exchange 
rate appreciation, which tends to pull resources away from the tradable sector and further lowers exports 
and induces additional imports. This type of Dutch disease effect is defined as the short-run impact when 
the growth rate impact has not been taken into consideration. Consistent with this broadly accepted Dutch 
disease outcome, the model shows that while oil increases total GDP statistically, growth in the tradable 
sectors, including the export agricultural and tradable nonagricultural sectors, actually declines sharply, 
particularly in the first year when oil revenues flow, while growth in nontraded nonagriculture rises 
significantly, from 5.6 percent in the base run’s 2010 to 8.4 percent. This structural effect of oil inflows 
leads to a decline in non-oil GDP growth (Table 1).  
Table 1. Short-run impact of oil revenue: Annual growth rate of total and sectoral GDP in the first 
five years under the model’s base run and first oil scenarios  
      2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Total GDP with oil  Oil-1  13.8  12.3  11.1  10.1  9.4  5.2 
Total non-oil GDP  Base run  5.8  5.7  5.6  5.5  5.4  5.4 
  Oil-1  5.5  5.3  5.2  5.2  5.1  5.2 
Domestic agriculture 
Base run  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.8  4.8 
Oil-1  4.6  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.8 
Export agriculture 
Base run  4.4  4.6  4.9  5.1  5.3  5.5 
Oil-1  -0.3  0.6  1.4  2.0  2.5  6.0 
Tradable 
nonagriculture 
Base run  5.1  5.1  5.1  5.1  5.1  5.1 
Oil-1  2.2  2.4  2.6  2.9  3.1  5.3 
Nontraded 
nonagriculture 
Base run  5.6  5.5  5.4  5.3  5.3  5.3 
Oil-1  8.4  7.9  7.5  7.1  6.8  5.2 
Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Notes: 1. Total oil revenue is assumed to equal the total value added of the new oil sector (given that extraction of oil is highly 
capital intensive and uses few intermediate inputs). Statistically, the oil sector’s total value added (including the part shared by 
the foreign company) is counted as part of Ghana’s GDP, which explains the sudden increases in the total GDP growth rate in the 
first few years when oil starts to be extracted—a similar situation observed in the other countries. 
2. Oil-1 indicates the first oil scenario, in which all oil revenue is spent on recurrent government expenditures. 10 
While the short-run impact presented in Table 1 is consistent with the general prediction of the 
Dutch disease theory, the theory itself does not provide a prediction of the longer term impacts. In this 
paper we focus on the longer term impact of oil revenue inflows on transitional growth, which can be 
analyzed using the intertemporal general equilibrium model. The longer term impact of oil revenue 
inflows is a combination of the allocation effect from the change in relative prices over time and the 
accumulation effect due to slower growth in savings and investment. This impact can be analyzed as the 
effect on the overall economy (growth effect on the non-oil economy) and on the different sectors 
(structural effect). The structural effect is due to differential growth across sectors as an outcome of the 
allocation effect. That is, the midterm growth rate increases in the nontraded sectors and declines in the 
tradable sectors. The growth effect is primarily an outcome of the accumulation effect, that is, responding 
to the change in economic structure, the overall growth in the non-oil economy slows with the decline in 
investment growth. However, constrained by the steady-state equilibrium condition in which productivity 
growth is exogenous and constant, in the long run sector growth converges and the long-run GDP growth 
rate in the scenarios with oil revenue equals that in the base run without oil revenue. The model also 
shows that the magnitude of the medium-run effect depends on the level of oil revenue growth. The 
higher the medium-run oil revenue growth rate is above the long-run GDP growth rate, the stronger the 
negative overall growth effect on the non-oil economy and the larger the structural effect in the medium 
run. We use Figure 1 to show the overall growth effect on the non-oil economy and Table 2 to show the 
structural effect in the medium run as the outcome of oil revenue inflows. In both the figure and the table, 
the growth rate of oil revenues in the “low oil growth” scenario is 5.06 percent annually after the first five 
years’ oil boom until 2030. This growth is consistent with the long-run GDP growth in the base run, while 
in the “high oil growth” scenario, oil revenue grows at 7.62 percent annually over the same period.  
Figure 1. Medium-run overall growth effect of oil revenue inflows 
 
Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Note: The low oil growth rate is 5.06 percent and the high oil growth rate is 7.62 percent. 
Given that all oil revenue is spent on recurrent government expenditures in the first oil scenario 
discussed in this section, the medium-run negative growth effect is only the result of slower capital 
accumulation and changes in factor allocation, while the productivity growth rate at the sector level is still 
the same as in the base run. Thus, as displayed in Figure 1, the negative medium-run growth effect of oil 
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term investment and hence capital accumulation will be consistent with long-run productivity and 
population growth in all the scenarios. While the negative growth effect diminishes in the long run, the 
structure of the economy is affected permanently. This can be seen clearly from Table 2, in which the 
non-oil GDP share of the nontraded nonagricultural sector rises from 41.1 percent in the base run’s 2030 
to 46.2–48.5 percent in the first oil scenario in the same year. The higher share of the nontraded sector’s 
GDP (48.5 percent) corresponds to the higher medium-run growth rate of oil revenue inflows. Moreover, 
this structural change becomes permanent if oil revenue continues to flow to the country in the long run. 
The long-term structural effect of oil revenues poses a huge challenge to countries such as Ghana and 
may undermine their industrialization process. The manufacturing sector remains small in many African 
countries, accounting for 10–15 percent of the economies. Instead of a growing manufacturing sector, the 
continuous expansion of nontraded industrial (construction) and service sectors, together with rapid urban 
population growth, seems to lead to urbanization without industrialization. This resource-driven 
development reflects the difficulty many African countries experience in pursuing sustained and broad-
based growth that allows the majority of the population to participate in the growth process. 
Table 2. Non-oil sector’s GDP share (total non-oil GDP = 100) 
   Base run  Spending all oil revenue 





2010       
Staple agriculture  22.7  22.8  22.8 
Export agriculture  11.0  10.6  10.6 
Tradable nonagriculture  16.2  15.8  15.8 
Nontraded nonagriculture  41.6  42.8  42.8 
2030       
Staple agriculture  20.9  21.4  21.5 
Export agriculture  12.0  10.5  9.6 
Tradable nonagriculture  15.9  14.6  13.8 
Nontraded nonagriculture  41.1  46.2  48.5 
Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Note: The low oil growth rate is 5.06 percent and the high oil growth rate is 7.62 percent. 
Can oil revenue be used smartly so that the negative growth and structural effect can be mitigated 
by better oil revenue management? We design two additional oil scenarios to investigate this possibility. 
In the next section, we first focus on the role of government investment financed by oil revenues before 
turning to the role of an oil fund in the remainder of the section. 12 
4.  CAN SMART USE OF OIL REVENUE MITIGATE DUTCH DISEASE?  
The analysis in the previous section shows that the Dutch disease effect of oil revenue inflows on growth 
and the structure of the economy can become permanent if these inflows last long and are spent on 
recurrent government expenditures. A smart use of oil revenues, thus, should reconsider this type of 
spending pattern. We consider two alternative oil revenue allocation options, as introduced in Section 2: 
(2) investment instead of recurrent spending and (3) the creation of an oil fund. In case (2), additional 
investment financed by oil revenues does not reduce additional demand by the government in the 
domestic market, and thus, if there is no externality effect of public investment on growth, the result of 
this scenario is expected to be similar to that of the first oil scenario. In case (3), the creation of an oil 
fund reduces the amount of oil revenue available for recurrent spending, and hence the oil fund is 
expected to partially mitigate the Dutch disease effect. The more oil revenue is allocated to the oil fund, 
the less oil income is available to the government and the weaker the Dutch disease effect. However, with 
increased oil revenue and the accumulation of the oil fund over time, revenue from continuous oil inflows 
and from oil fund withdrawals will eventually increase and be spent by the government. This implies that 
an oil fund can postpone the Dutch disease effect but may be unable to fully mitigate it over time. Thus, 
to overcome the negative effect of oil revenue inflows, productivity-enhancing public investments can be 
an option to accelerate growth. We investigate the outcome of this option using the model. 
Linkages between public investment and productivity growth are an empirical issue, and no 
structural model exists to formally analyze such linkages. As an empirical issue, the magnitude of the 
productivity enhancement of public investment varies in the literature due to differences in estimation 
methods, country and sector focus, and datasets used for estimation. Moreover, a country’s institutional 
and policy environment matter in determining the efficiency and effectiveness of public investments. The 
purpose of the scenarios designed in this paper is not to assess whether public investment can stimulate 
productivity growth in the private sector and what the magnitude of such an impact may be. Rather, we 
focus on whether investment can fully mitigate the Dutch disease effect on both growth and structural 
change. In the simulations, we assume that the spillover effect of public investment on productivity 
occurs in the 10th year, and that the effect is modest from the 10th to the 15th year and then takes full 
effect after that. Specifically, we define the elasticity ε in equation (3) of Section 2 to be 0.01–0.05 
between the 10th and 14th year and 0.06 for all the years after the 14th year. These elasticities imply that 
for each 1 percent additional growth in public investment, the productivity growth rate of labor and land 
increases by 0.01–0.05 percentage points in the 10th to the 14th year and by 0.06 percentage points after 
that. Consistent with the previous section, we further consider two different oil revenue growth rates in 
the medium run. For example, with the higher oil growth rate and without the creation of an oil fund, 
investing 50 percent of oil revenue is associated with an annual productivity growth rate of 2.66 percent 
by the 16th year, rising from 2.5 percent in the base run. The productivity growth rate starts to fall when 
the oil revenue growth rate converges to its long-run rate after the 25th year. In the long run the 
productivity growth rate is only slightly higher (2.54 percent) than in the base run (2.50 percent).  
We first focus the discussion on the growth effect of oil-financed public investment. In Figure 2, 
we present the non-oil GDP growth rates between 2015 and 2030 to show the medium-run effect of oil-
financed public investment. The GDP growth path differs depending on the oil growth rate. Under the low 
oil growth rate situation, annual non-oil GDP growth bounces back to its base-run level in the 15th year 
(2021) and stays above the base-run growth rate in subsequent years. Under the high oil growth situation, 
non-oil GDP growth returns to its base-run level six years later, in the 21st year (2027), and is only 
slightly higher than the base-run growth rate after that. It should be noted that more oil revenue is 
invested under the high oil growth situation compared to the low oil growth situation. While more net 
gain in additional GDP growth as the result of additional productivity growth is seen in the case with the 
high oil growth rate than in that with the low oil growth rate (which is captured by a relatively wider gap 
between the two growth paths corresponding to the two oil scenarios with the high oil growth rate than 
between the scenarios with the low oil growth rate in Figure 2), productivity growth as the result of 13 
increased public investment cannot compensate the loss in non-oil GDP growth due to the high oil growth 
rate in the medium run. The results of the second oil scenario indicate that the positive productivity effect 
of oil-financed public investment is not always able to mitigate the negative growth effect of the Dutch 
disease in the medium run. The conclusion depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
investment in stimulating productivity growth. Yet, with the same investment-to-productivity-growth 
elasticity, it can be said that the more oil revenue flowing in the country each year, the less likely the 
public investment to fully mitigate the negative growth effect of Dutch disease. 
Figure 2. Growth effect of oil revenue inflows – investing vs. spending 
 
Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Note: The low oil growth rate is 5.06 percent and the high oil growth rate is 7.62 percent. 
Now we turn to the structural effect of oil-funded public investment. As discussed in the previous 
section, the tradable sector’s growth is negatively affected by the oil inflows. Thus, we assume that oil-
funded public investment particularly targets productivity growth in the two agricultural sectors and the 
tradable nonagricultural sector, while productivity in the nontraded nonagricultural sector and the mining 
sector will not benefit directly. For the structural effect, we focus the discussion on both the medium and 
long run and, in Table 3, report GDP shares for the four main economic sectors in 2030 and 2050 under 
different scenarios with the two different oil growth rates. Some of the results shown in Table 3 were 
already reported in Table 2, but, for the purpose of comparison, we include them again. Comparing the 
result under the second oil scenario (“investing 50% of oil revenue”) with that under the first oil scenario 
(“spending all oil revenue”), GDP shares for the export agriculture and tradable nonagricultural sectors 
slightly increase when public investment raises productivity growth in these two sectors. However, the 
role of public investment in mitigating the economic structural effect is very modest both in the medium 
run and in the long run. The nontraded nonagricultural sector continues to expand from its base-run level, 
even though the sector is assumed not to benefit directly from increased public investment. Again, with 
the same investment-to-productivity-growth elasticity, a high oil growth rate (even though higher oil 
growth also indicates more oil-funded investment) makes public investment less effective in mitigating 
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Table 3. Structural effect of oil revenue inflows under different oil management scenarios (total 
non-oil GDP = 100) 
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Oil fund 
50% of oil 
revenue 
2030               
Staple agriculture  20.9  21.4  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.7  21.6 
Export agriculture  12.0  10.5  10.9  11.0  9.6  10.0  10.4 
Tradable 
nonagriculture  15.9  14.6  14.7  14.8  13.8  13.9  14.2 
Nontraded 
nonagriculture  41.1  46.2  46.0  45.7  48.5  48.2  47.3 
2050               
Staple agriculture  20.0  20.5  20.6  20.7  20.6  20.9  20.9 
Export agriculture  14.2  12.2  12.8  12.9  11.1  11.9  11.9 
Tradable 
nonagriculture  15.8  14.4  14.5  14.5  13.6  13.7  13.7 
Nontraded 
nonagriculture  41.5  46.4  46.0  46.0  48.7  48.1  48.1 
Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Note: The low oil growth rate is 5.06 percent and the high oil growth rate is 7.62 percent. 
In the third oil scenario, 50 percent of current oil revenues are allocated into an oil fund, and the 
rest are split equally into investment and recurrent spending. The risk-free return (which equals the 
interest rate) from the oil fund, together with 5.1 percent of oil fund stock, is spent in the same way as the 
50 percent of the current oil inflows. As the speed of spending oil revenue slows in the short and medium 
runs in this scenario compared with that in the two previous scenarios, the short-run shock on GDP 
growth becomes relatively modest but still exists (Figure 3). However, because less oil revenue is 
allocated to investment each year, given a similar oil growth rate, the growth enhancement effect in the 
medium run is also more modest with the oil fund than without it. But given that the speed of spending oil 
fund revenues is assumed to be similar to the growth rate of oil revenues in the long run, the available oil 
revenue to be spent each year is similar in all three oil scenarios in the long run. Thus, the long-run 
structural change effect is indifferent under the three alternative oil management options, while there is a 
slight improvement in the structural effect in the medium run when an oil fund is created (see the results 
of the third columns under both low and high oil growth rates in Table 3).  15 
Figure 3. Short- to medium-run effect of alternative oil management options on GDP growth 
  
Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Note: The high oil growth rate is 7.62 percent. 
Finally, we show in Figure 4 the negative effect of oil inflows on the level of non-oil GDP over 
the entire simulation period (2010–2050) under the three oil management scenarios. Again, we also 
consider two different oil growth rates in each of the three scenarios. We report this effect as the 
difference from the base run’s GDP level in the same year. The first panel of Figure 4 reflects the three 
scenarios with low oil growth while the second panel of the figure represents the same scenarios with 
high oil growth. The loss in GDP is significant if there is no measure to mitigate the Dutch disease: GDP 
will be US$2.62–3.66 billion less compared to the base run by 2050, where the lower number is for the 
low oil growth rate and the higher number is for the high oil growth rate. The mitigating effect of the two 
alternative oil management options is similar in the long run: The loss in GDP is reduced to US$1.44–
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Source: The simulation result of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS  
Foreign inflows are important sources of income that many African governments use to finance 
investments. Many countries intend to follow the Asian model and gear foreign inflows toward enhancing 
export-oriented manufacturing or service sectors to accelerate economic growth and structural 
transformation. Yet in many African economies the manufacturing sector has grown more slowly than 
other sectors, and rapid growth in domestic-oriented industries (urban construction and utilities) and 
services has made these sectors the largest in their economies. Motivated by these stylized facts, we use 
Ghana and its newly found oil as an example and analyze the dynamic relationship between increased 
inflows of petrodollars, economic growth, and structural change. The analysis is based on an 
intertemporal general equilibrium model with five economic sectors and three alternative oil revenue 
management options.  
We find that the increased foreign inflows from petrodollars generate a substantial short-run 
growth shock in non-oil sectors, as predicted by the Dutch disease theory, if the oil revenues are used by 
the government to finance either recurrent spending or public investment. The growth reduction in the 
tradable sectors and increase in the nontraded sectors cause the structure of the economy to become more 
nontradable dominated. When the creation of an oil fund reduces the availability of oil revenues to be 
spent by the government in the short run, the negative growth effect becomes relatively modest. In the 
medium run, if oil spending does not enhance productivity growth, the rate of non-oil economic growth 
slows and the GDP share of the nontraded sector in the economy further increases. Moreover, the impact 
on the economic structure persists as long as oil revenue continues to flow in the country. Thus, Dutch 
disease can be a longer term phenomenon and a challenge for growth.  
Smart use of oil revenues requires not only the creation of an oil fund but also the financing of 
productivity-enhancing public investment. While the mitigating role of public investment depends on its 
effectiveness and efficiency, our paper emphasizes that the growth magnitude of oil inflows matters for 
the mitigation effect. At the same level of investment-to-productivity-growth efficiency, and if the 
inflows continue to grow at a relatively high rate, it takes the economy longer to overcome Dutch disease 
than in a situation in which the inflows grow at a slower pace. Moreover, our paper shows that the 
structural effects of Dutch disease on economic development are more difficult to correct and in fact can 
become a persistent phenomenon in countries that continue to receive foreign inflows in the form of 
petrodollars or in any other forms.  
Obviously, the longer term structural effect of foreign inflows poses a huge challenge to 
economic transformation in African countries such as Ghana. The rigidness in their economic structures 
challenges these countries as they attempt to pursue sustained and broad-based growth in which a 
majority of the population participates and poverty is reduced. Although the importance of institutional 
and historical factors for understanding the challenges faced by African countries in achieving sustainable 
and broad-based growth has been broadly discussed in the literature, challenges posed by significant 
increases in foreign inflows over the past two decades deserve more attention and assessment.  18 
APPENDIX A:  SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
Figure A.1. Sector shares in GDP (Ghana: 1984–2008)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on World Bank 2010. 
Note: “Other industry” includes construction, urban utilities, and mining.  
Figure A.2. Model calibration of GDP and agricultural GDP ()  
 
Source: Backcast base run of the multisector intertemporal general equilibrium model for Ghana.  
Note: Normalized, value in 1995 = 1. 19 
APPENDIX B:  MATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION OF THE MULTISECTOR 
INTERTEMPORAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL  
A.1. Glossary 
A.1.1. Parameters 
i Λ :  Shift parameter in Armington import function for good i 
i Γ :  Shift parameter in Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) export function for good i 
i A :  Shift parameter in value-added production function for good i 
i β :   Share parameter in Armington import function for domestically produced good i  
i η :   Share parameter in CET export function for domestically produced good i  
f i, α :   Share parameter in value-added production function for good i and factor f 
ioi,j:  Input-output coefficient for good i used in sector j 
i θ :  Marginal budget share for good i consumed by consumers 
i γ :  Subsistence parameter for good i in composite good 
i ϖ :  Share parameter for good i consumed by government 
i π :  Share parameter for good i used for investment 
a :  Allocation rule for current oil revenue 
b :  Allocation rule for oil fund 
M
i ε :  Elasticity of substitution in Armington import function for good i  
E
i ε :  Elasticity of substitution in CET export function for good i  









σ :  Elasticity of substitution in intertemporal utility function  
µ :  Time preference in intertemporal utility function 
λ :  Parameter in capital adjustment function 
δ :  Capital depreciation rate  
f g :  Exogenous growth rate of factor f’s productivity  
i ε :  Elasticity of increased productivity growth rate with respect to increased public capital stock from 
its base-run level 20 
A.1.2. Exogenous variables 
t f V , :  Level of labor and land supply 
1 , k V :  Initial level of capital supply as f = k 
PoPt:  Level of population 
gov
t trns : Transfer from government to households 
row
t trns : Transfer from rest of world to households 
gov
t S :  Government savings 
row
t S :  Exogenous foreign inflows irrelevant to oil revenues 
oil
t CY :  Exogenous oil revenue inflows 
oil
t LY :  Stock of oil fund 
oil
t TY :  Total oil-related revenue spent at time t 
PWEi,t: World FOB price for good i 
PWMi,t: World CIF price for good i  
M
t i, τ :   Tariff rate 
E
t i, τ :   Export tax 
X
t i, τ :   Value-added tax 
CC
t i, τ :   Sales tax 
EXRt:  Exchange rate  
DEBT1: Initial level of foreign debt 
P
t K :  Stock of public investment with oil revenue spent on public investment 
0 , P
t K :  Stock of public investment without oil revenue spent on public investment 
P
t K ∆ :  Flow of public investment with oil revenue spent on public investment 
0 , P
t K ∆ : Flow of public investment without oil revenue spent on public investment 
t f i B , , :  Level of factor productivity in value-added production function for good i and factor f 
   21 
A.1.3. Endogenous variables 
PXi,t:  Producer price for good i  
PVAi,t:  Value-added part producer price for good i  
Pi,t:  Price for Armington good i  
PDi,t:  Price for good i produced and consumed domestically 
PQt:  Price for composite good 
Wf,t:  Returns or wage rate for factor f  
K
t P :  Unit value of investment 
rt:  Interest rate in domestic capital market 
Xi,t:  Output of good i  
CCi,t:  Armington good i  
Ei,t:  Exports of good i  
Mi,t:  Imports of good i  
Zi,t:  Armington good i  
Di,t:  Good i produced and consumed domestically 
Ci,t:  Consumer demand for good i  
gov
t i C , :  Government demand for good i 
J
t i C , :  Intermediate demand for good i by sector j 
INV
t i C , :  Investment demand for good i  
Qt:  Composite good 
Yt:  Total household income 
gov
t Y :  Government income 
It:  Capital investment in quantity 
qt:  Tobin’s q in capital adjustment function 
H
t S :  Household savings 
U1:  Intertemporal utility function 
P
t i g , :  Endogenous part of factor productivity growth rate 
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A.2. Equations 
A.2.1. Intratemporal equations 
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Factor market equilibrium 
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Household income and demand 
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A.2.2. Intertemporal equations  
Intertemporal utility function and Euler equation 
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Factor productivity growth rate 





















1 , , , , , ) 1 ( − ⋅ + + = t f i
p
t i f t f i B g g B    
A.2.3. Terminal conditions (steady-state constraints) 
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The model is solved using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). 25 
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